Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

6-30-2021

Cryptoassets and their Regulation under UK and EU Law in the
Post-Brexit UK
Sarah Jane Hughes
Maurer School of Law - Indiana University, sjhughes@indiana.edu

Sara Kobal
Maurer School of Law - Indiana University, skobal@iu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Hughes, Sarah Jane and Kobal, Sara, "Cryptoassets and their Regulation under UK and EU Law in the PostBrexit UK" (2021). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 3017.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/3017

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

10/10/2021, 05:13

Cryptoassets and their regulation under UK and EU law in the post-Brexit UK - Financial Regulation International

Cryptoassets and their regulation under UK and EU law
in the post-Brexit UK
Jun 30 2021

Cryptoassets are used increasingly as stores of value, means of making payments in domestic and cross-border transactions
(including person-to-person (“P2P”) payments), and as enterprise solutions for speedier execution of trades in financial instruments
or other commerce. Their emergence from the work of Satoshi Nakamoto1 to real-world applications has prompted attention from
legislatures, regulators including law enforcement agencies, service providers and adopters.
The UK, as well as other nations, has used its legislative and regulatory authority to attract crypto-businesses and other financialservices innovators to its shores. Because some nations seek to entice financial innovations and others remain sceptical, tensions will
arise between these two camps. Tensions create uncertainty in markets and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.
Regulating cryptoassets necessarily implicates appreciating their current and potential utilities. When regulators approach a
cryptoasset or question how the asset operates, their characterisation of the asset may depend on how the cryptoasset may be
marketed or used. Additionally, regulatory decisions may depend on traditional differences between regulation for the sake of
consumer protection (including licensure and prudential regulation), criminal law, domestic monetary control and policy, and
national security (including anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-finance purposes). Cryptoassets regulatory decisions are
also influenced by the terminology used to explain comparable, non-crypto products and services.
The UK’s complete separation from the EU on 31 December 2020 provides fresh opportunities for innovation in cryptoassets markets
and their regulation on both sides of the English Channel. This article looks at the foundational agreements that influence Post-Brexit
regulation and uses them to analyse recent policy and judicial actions relating to cryptoassets in the UK and other EU member states.
The second part of this paper provides background on EU laws that the UK will remain obligated to observe post-Brexit. What is
commonly known as “Brexit”, the UK’s exit from the EU, officially began on 31 January 2020 and ended on 31 December 2020. This
transition period (known as the “Implementation Period” or “IP”) was regulated by the EU (“Withdrawal Agreement”) Act. PostBrexit relations between the UK and the EU are governed by several Agreements signed by the Parties and negotiated following the
UK’s 2016 referendum on membership. Among these forward-looking Agreements is the Trade and Cooperation Agreement
[hereinafter “the Trade Agreement”].2 For a better understanding of its effect on providers of cryptoassets, we discuss the UK’s
position towards the body of EU law that the UK has agreed to follow after Brexit.
The third and fourth parts frame issues related to internal law decisions in the UK, France, and Italy as examples of this complex of
internal (or national) and EU law that is emerging. The final part provides some observations on what the Trade Agreement and
developments in internal and EU laws – whether legislative, regulatory, or judicially made law – may mean to the opportunities for
wider adoption of cryptoassets in the EU, UK, and, of course, the US. It also shares some questions to be explored in future projects.

EU laws and their application Post-Brexit in the UK
The EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act provides that the UK will retain all the acquis communautaire as it was on IP completion, 31
December 2020.3 As a result, the principle of “primacy” of EU law, established by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in its
caselaw,4 applies for the UK to EU law as it was on 31 December 2020. This means that internal judges will interpret statutes
predating IP completion and that are connected to EU law or EU principles, as well as their amendments, even when made after IP
completion, in correlation with the body of EU provisions valid on 31 December 2020. This is true to the extent that subsequent
amendments maintain the spirit of cooperation among member states that characterised the original statute. In addition, if an
internal judge finds that a “national provision” – a statute enacted by a state – contrasts with EU legislation or fundamental
principles, the court is required not to apply the non-conforming statute, pursuant to the principle of “disapplication” of contrasting
national norms as set forth in the ECJ caselaw.5 The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which for EU member states has been part of
the EU Treaties since the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon,6 is excluded from the so-called “retained EU law” and, therefore, no longer will be
applied to entities or disputes in the UK.7
The Trade Agreement, one of the EU-UK agreements for the UK’s exit, regulates their post-Brexit commercial relationships,
including cross-border trade in goods and services, cross-border capital movements, and other cross-border transactions. For readers
not familiar with the Trade Agreement’s terminology, the term “cross-border” means UK to EU and vice versa and the term “Party”
means either the EU (or one of its member states) or the UK.
For cross-border trade in cryptoassets, the key portions of the Agreement are Title II (Services and Investments or “SERVIN”) and
Title IV (Capital Movements or “CAP”) of Heading 1 of Pt Two. Paragraph 2 of article SERVIN.1.1 provides:
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“The Parties reaffirm the right to regulate within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as: the protection of
public health; social services; public education; safety; the environment, including climate change; public morals; social or
consumer protection; privacy and data protection or the promotion and protection of cultural diversity.”
Article CAP.4, on capital movements reads:
“1. Articles CAP.2 [Current account] and CAP.3 [Capital movements] shall not be construed as preventing a Party from applying
its laws and regulations relating to:
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors;
(b) issuing, trading or dealing in securities, or futures, options and other financial instruments;
(c) financial reporting or record keeping of capital movements, payments or transfers where necessary to assist law enforcement or
financial regulatory authorities;
(d) criminal or penal offences, deceptive or fraudulent practices;
(e) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in judicial or administrative proceedings; or
(f) social security, public retirement or compulsory savings schemes.
2. The laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be applied in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner, or otherwise constitute a disguised restriction on capital movements, payments or transfers.”
Article SERVIN.1.3 provides that:
“1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Title and Title IV [Capital movements, payments, transfers and temporary safeguard
measures] of this Heading to an investor or service supplier of the other Party, or to a covered enterprise, if the denying Party
adopts or maintains measures related to the maintenance of international peace and security, including the protection of human
rights, which:
(a) prohibit transactions with that investor, service supplier or covered enterprise; or
(b) would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Title and Title IV [Capital movements, payments, transfers and
temporary safeguard measures] of this Heading were accorded to that investor, service supplier or covered enterprise, including
where the measures prohibit transactions with a natural or legal person which owns or controls any of them.
2. For greater certainty, para 1 is applicable to Title IV [Capital movements, payments, transfers and temporary safeguard
measures] of this Heading to the extent that it relates to services or investment with respect to which a Party has denied the
benefits of this Title.”
With this background, we now discuss the state of regulation of cryptoassets in light of the Withdrawal Agreements and the acquis
communautaire.

How does the Withdrawal Agreement affect cryptoassets in the UK?
These are early days for the EU and UK under the Withdrawal Agreement. Regardless, the three of its provisions introduced in the
second part of this paper will shape the near-term issues facing providers of cryptoassets. We start with the premise that cryptoassets
can be characterised into two big “silos”– as “investment products” or “payment products”. Depending on the characterisation, EU
law will treat providers either as dealers in “financial instruments”, as such subject to Title II of the Agreement, or as regulated by
Title IV on “capital movements.”
The Trade Agreements are two-directional: national regulators in the EU or a regulator in the UK retain power within their own
national jurisdiction to decide how cryptoassets should be classified and, accordingly, regulated. Stated differently, a national
regulator in the EU or a UK regulator can deny benefits deriving from Title II or Title IV – or from both titles – if it considers a
service provider or the entity is attempting to move capital as a threat to national security or consumer protection or if it is concerned
that the entity is engaging in criminal activities.
In this scenario, cryptoassets are favourable grounds for experimentation: they are a new, lively and growing market and are still
highly unregulated. As a consequence, EU and UK regulators and courts deciding cases involving cryptoassets have some leeway to
explore the breadth of the clauses of the Trade Agreement. UK regulators – and providers seeking to offer products from the UK –
will need to pay careful attention to how regulators and courts in the EU deal with cryptoassets and providers of cryptoasset services.
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What do recent decisions in the UK, France, and Italy tell us about the future
regulation of cryptoassets?
To illustrate how the treatment of cryptoassets on both sides of the English Channel, after Brexit, will influence the future of
cryptoassets and the regulation of assets and providers we chose examples from the UK, France, and Italy.

The UK Financial Conduct Authority’s October 2020 Policy Statement
The first example of this dynamic is Policy Statement 20/10, released by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) in October 2020.
Policy Statement 20/10 entered into force on 6 January 2021.8 Policy Statement 20/10 forbids firms and banks to offer and sell to
retail consumers derivatives or exchange-traded notes with certain categories of crypto as the underlying assets.
In particular, Policy Statement 20/10 bans investments referencing unregulated cryptoassets (cryptoassets that do not have a
currency or a commodity underlying or that are not tokenisations of other recognised securities).9 Policy Statement 20/10 takes the
position that, given the trends on exchanges and the mixed social perception of crypto exchanges, cryptoassets without blessed
underlyings do not have intrinsic value, are not to be perceived as “currencies,” and should be considered as speculative devices. The
FCA supports Policy Statement 20/10 because of high correlation of the prices of different cryptocurrencies, the increase of Google
searches related to Bitcoin or Ether, and the high volatility in price of these assets. As a result of these factors, it is difficult for
consumers to determine the value of the underlying and to make informed choices on the products that are being offered. The
circumstance, according to the FCA, justifies the adoption of the measure.
Before issuing Policy Statement 20/10, the FCA opened the consultation to National Competent Authorities from the European
Economic Area (“EEA”) and to the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”). After having satisfied the Costs and
Benefits Analysis and met the proportionality requirements, the discipline falls in the exceptions to the freedom of movement of
services and capitals in Titles II and IV, mentioned above. Moreover, in para 2.28 of its response to the consultation, the FCA
explicitly addresses criticism concerning the proportionality of the measure by restating its conviction that Policy Statement 20/10 is
in line with the exceptions set forth in the Market in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation (“MiFID II” and “MiFIR II”).10
The FCA’s position on “proportionality” demonstrates a practical application of the “primacy” principle, as curtailed by the EU
(Withdrawal Agreement) Act. In fact, even though the measures included in Policy Statement 20/10 came into force only on 6
January 2021, following the IP completion, the FCA performed the proportionality test in compliance with exceptions provided for by
MiFID II and MiFIR II that require proportionality analyses.11

France’s 2019 Loi PACTE and the Autorité des Marchés Financiers’ Technical Framework
Other EU member states had regulated cryptoassets before the entry into force of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. This is the
case in France, where the legislature promulgated the Loi PACTE (Plan d’Action pour la Croissance et la Transformation des
Entreprises) in 2019. The Loi PACTE’s art 83, 85, 86, 87, and 88 outline a regime for cryptoassets and for dealers in cryptoassets,
leaving to the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) the task to lay down the technical framework.
The AMF did so in book VII of its Règlément Général, broadly subjecting all crypto-miners or issuers and dealers, exchanges, or other
service providers to basic standards of consumer protection and compliance with anti-Money Laundering Legislation, pursuant to
MiFID II. Moreover, the AMF created a preferential treatment for authorised dealers in cryptoassets.12 In fact, the so-called
“prestataires de services sur actifs numériques agréés” (authorised dealers in cryptoassets), in exchange for agreeing to higher
consumer protection, security and transparency standards, may obtain an authorisation from the AMF called a “visa,” and are free to
advertise their products to the general public, including to retail consumers.13
The AMF reserved the right to perform control activities and evaluate compliance with its requirements and has the power to
withdraw the authorisations given. The AMF also can stop permission for any advertising if it establishes violations, frauds, or
discrepancies between the activities carried out and those declared in the documentation presented to the AMF to obtain the
authorisation. Even though enacted before the Trade Agreement, and as such hypothetically covered by the catch-all clause for nonconforming measures, the French approach to regulating cryptoassets and crypto-dealers is compatible with the text of the Trade
Agreement. Treating cryptoassets as “financial instruments” makes it possible to bring cryptoassets under MiFID II, which is both
retained EU law for the UK and a regulation of the movement of capitals and services that the Parties (EU member states and the UK)
remain free to enact even following the Trade Agreement.

Italy’s Corte di Cassazione’s September 2020 Judgment in A Criminal Prosecution
Our third example of how the Trade Agreement may affect providers of cryptoassets seeking to operate across the new EU-UK border
is from Italy. In Italy, the legislature has enacted few requirements related to the crypto universe; it largely relies on “use case”
discipline and pre-existing (legacy) legislation. The paucity of law in Italy and the growing market for crypto-assets leave room for
courts to play a big role in Italy as well as in the EU and UK cryptoassets economic sector.
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Our example came in a decision of one of the criminal Chambers of the Corte di Cassazione, the Italian Supreme Court. The court
rendered its September 2020 judgment 26807/2020 involving an appeal of a seizure of cryptoassets, ordered by the Giudice delle
Indagini Preliminari in Milan and affirmed by the Giudice del Riesame.14 The prosecutor requested the seizure because the person
indicted had deposited the profits of fraud into foreign online bank accounts, nominally held by his family members but ultimately
traceable to him, to launder the money through the purchase of Bitcoin. The prosecution’s theory was that the bitcoins were then sold
and the earnings deposited again in the foreign bank accounts and made available to the indicted person.
We will focus our consideration on one of several issues raised by defence counsel. The court summarises the issue as follows:
“Defence Counsel also alleges the violation of articles 1.2 and 166.1 lett. C) d.lgs. 58/98 (TUF), of art. 125.3 code of criminal
procedure, of art. 321 code of criminal procedure and of art. 324.7 in conjunction with art. 309.9 code of criminal procedure. D.lgs.
90/17 defined the business of virtual exchange offices creating a peculiar space for exchange offices and exempting them from
applying the legislation on financial instruments, because virtual currencies were not considered as investment products, but as
means of payment (art. 1.2 TUF provides that ‘means of payments are not financial instruments’). This choice was perfectly
consistent with EU law and especially with the ECJ opinion in the preliminary ruling of October 22nd, 2016, concerning the
exchange of the virtual currency bitcoin for fiat currency, clarifying that Bitcoin had no other use than that of means of payment.
Given these data, it was odd for the lower court to state that Bitcoin were a financial instrument. Even more so since it seemed
perfectly aware of the peculiarity of its assessment when it generically and imprecisely referenced ‘EU law and Consob’ and
subverted the hierarchy of the sources of law of our legal system, considering an ECJ decision and a legislative decree subordinate
to an ECB opinion or to an opinion issued by Consob or to an EU Directive with no effect for citizens, not having yet been
transfused into internal legislation.”
In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Corte di Cassazione explained:
“The third issue raised on appeal is groundless too. […] [It] does not take into account the arguments on page 13 of the appealed
order where the court highlights that the sales of Bitcoin [were] advertised as an investment proposal. In fact, on the website where
it was advertised there was information allowing potential investors to decide whether or not to accept the proposal, stating that
‘those who gambled on Bitcoin have earned more than 97% in two years. Therefore, this is an activity subject to the obligations set
forth in articles 91 and following provisions of the TUF, whose omission constitutes a crime according to art. 166.1 lett. c) TUF.’”15
Italian scholars have interpreted this decision as the attempt by the highest judicial authority in Italy to provide for classification of
cryptoassets.16 Accordingly, in a context like the Corte di Cassazione’s recent ruling, cryptoassets should be treated as “investments”
and considered “financial instruments.” As such, they would fall under Title II (Services and Investments) of the Trade Agreement
and national governments in the EU and the UK would remain free to impose – and their courts to enforce – regulations furthering
anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing policies. The ruling of the Cassazione, then, would find its place in a
broader “consumer protection” framework to foster their policy objectives.
Reading the opinion more closely, we notice another phenomenon, which could have repercussions on the interpretation and
application of the Trade Agreement. As we mentioned above, the ruling was entered on an appeal of a decision of a criminal court
authorising a seizure pending trial of money deposited in current accounts traceable to the people indicted in the main proceedings.
The prosecutor had charged the appellant with fraud and was attempting to obtain evidence that the profits from the crime had been
deposited in foreign current accounts and then laundered through the purchase of Bitcoin on websites traceable to the indicted
people. AML obligations apply to dealers in financial instruments that in Italy are subject to the duties deriving both from the
package of measures contained in MiFID II and MiFIR II and to those set forth in the TUF (d.lgs.58/1998).
However, individuals and entities taking funds as means of payment for goods, services or other fees are not held to the same strict
standards of AML due diligence. Consequently, the prosecutor’s office had two options: qualifying Bitcoin as “means of payment” or
as “financial instruments”. In the first case, prosecutors would have been able to charge the indicted people with fraud but not with
violations of the AML regulations, so a seizure of the proceedings of the sale of Bitcoin purchased with the profits from the crime
would be impossible. In fact, even though the accounts used to pay for the Bitcoin were traceable to the indicted people and so were
the websites on which the transactions were finalised, the dealer had no duty to perform checks on the origin of the money.
On the other hand, if the transactions were qualified as “investments,” they would fall under the regulation on “financial
instruments”. If the transactions were in “financial instruments,” the prosecutor could charge the accused not only with fraud, but
also with violations of AML policies, and offer evidence of the serial transfers of money that start as “fiat currency” (Euros, for
example) earned unlawfully, become Bitcoin through a website traceable to the same people who had committed the crime, and then
are reverted to “clean” fiat currency and deposited back into regulated bank accounts.
The prosecutor opted for the second theory and the Corte di Cassazione affirmed the ruling. The Corte di Cassazione anchored its
opinion to a fact-specific circumstance: the transactions in Bitcoin were advertised as an “investment” proposal and prospective
clients could find data to help them make an informed decision on the same website where they could finalise their purchases.
Examining the facts of the case from this perspective prompts us to a different assessment of the attitude of the Cassazione. In fact,
the lower court granting the order and the Cassazione affirming it were not actually attempting to systematise cryptoassets but rather
https://www.financialregulationintl.com/regulation/cryptoassets-and-their-regulation-under-uk-and-eu-law-in-the-post-brexit-uk-147934.htm
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attempting to ensure the application of a restrictive measure against an individual so that the prosecutor could propose a stronger
theory of the case, thus increasing the chances of conviction.

What do the withdrawal agreement and our three examples tell us about the future
of cryptoassets regulation in the EU and UK?
The split between the true causes of the Corte di Cassazione’s ruling and scholarly interpretations of the decision shows a need for the
crypto world to pay attention to how specific cryptoassets may be classified across national legal systems and internally in national
systems. One can make a case for regulators to establish clearer classifications of crypto-assets. One can argue that clearer regulatory
categorisations would encourage dealers to innovate and reduce transaction costs. Finally, one can argue that establishing regulatory
categorisations create regulatory loopholes that providers can exploit – and lead to regulatory arbitrage17 among the Parties to the
Agreement in the EU and the UK.
Should systematisation of cryptoassets be left to courts in the EU or UK, as opposed to legislatures or regulators? We think the
answer is obvious: systemisation of cryptoassets is best achieved through legislation. Legislation offers a clearer framework for crossborder investors and consumers, providing certainty on the breadth of the exceptions to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement
before problems arise and not after, as is the case with court rulings.
To reduce hidden barriers to cross-border providers of cryptoassets that dependence on judicially made law would afford, legislation
– or regulation subject to public consultation (referred to as “notice and comment” in the US) – is needed. The EU Commission
apparently shares our preference because it has advanced a proposal for a packet of regulations concerning cryptoassets, cryptodealers and DLTs.18 Choosing regulations instead of directives will give the EU greater power to shape its internal market’s response
to the demands of this growing economic sector, while also maximising the uniformity of the treatment of cryptoassets among EU
member states. The UK and stakeholders operating in a cross-border context should favour this move by the European Commission,
as it will provide a uniform categorisation of cryptoassets and will encourage a common response to money laundering and counterterrorism financing.
Greater certainty in the EU, once attained, could promote achievement of greater certainty among other nations that currently
regulate cryptoassets. Alternatively, it could open more opportunities for regulatory arbitrage among nations on both sides of the
Atlantic and elsewhere. The issues related to regulating cryptoassets on a larger scale and as consistently as is practical, accordingly,
are among the issues with which lawyers as well as regulators will become familiar. These are fertile grounds for future innovation
and research.
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